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Available online 23 December 2007Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we investigated
brain activity elicited by a computer-animated child's actions that
appeared consistent and inconsistent with a computer-animated adult's
instructions. Participants observed a computer-animated adult verbally
instructing a computer-animated child to touch one of two objects. The
child performed correctly in half of the trials and incorrectly in the
other half. We observed significantly greater activity when the child
performed incorrectly compared to correctly in regions of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) that have been implicated in
maintaining our intentions in working memory and implementing
cognitive control. However, no such effects were found in regions of the
posterior superior temporal sulcus (posterior STS) that have been
posited to interpret other people's behavior. These findings extend the
role of the DLPFC in cognitive control to evaluating the social outcomes
of other people's behavior and provide important new constraints for
theories of how the posterior STS contributes to social cognition.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Planning appropriate behavior in social situations sometimes
requires us to determine whether one person's actions appear
consistent with a second person's intentions. For example, in order
to appropriately plan his or her next behavior toward a suspect, a
police officer may need to evaluate whether the suspect's behavior
appears consistent (e.g., putting his hands up) or inconsistent (e.g.,
running away) with a second officer's stated intentions for the
suspect (e.g., “put your hands up!”). Making accurate evaluations
of other people's behavior is thought to require a ‘theory of mind’⁎ Corresponding author.
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doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.12.021(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983); that is,
an understanding that other people have minds, knowledge, and
intentions that differ from our own. When one's ‘theory of mind’ is
disrupted by abnormal brain functioning, as in autism (Hill and
Frith, 2003), one's understanding of other people can be selectively
impaired. Therefore, developing neurobiological models of social
phenomena is an important step toward understanding how we
interpret and evaluate other people's behavior.
Current models suggest that two regions of the human brain -
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (posterior STS) - may play especially
important roles in evaluating other people's behavior. The DLPFC
is thought to support cognitive control processes that enable us to
voluntarily control our actions (Baddeley, 1986; MacDonald et al.,
2000; Weissman et al., 2004). Specifically, the DLPFC is thought
to maintain representations of our current intentions, along with the
rules for accomplishing those intentions, in working memory
(Miller and Cohen, 2001). The DLPFC is also posited to create and
maintain links between our actions and their eventual outcomes in
working memory, so that our previous experiences can guide the
selection of future behaviors (Genovesio et al., 2006; Petrides,
1995; Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi, 2004, 2005). Consistent with this
view, our ability to use feedback about previous actions to guide
future behavior can be severely impaired following damage to the
DLPFC (Barcelo and Knight, 2002; Grafman et al., 1990).
Given its role in maintaining our intentions in working memory
and in using feedback to evaluate whether our actions are
consistent with those intentions, we hypothesize that the DLPFC
may make an important contribution to cognitive control in social
situations. Specifically, it may maintain our understanding of one
person's intentions in working memory and evaluate whether a
second person's actions appear consistent with those intentions. In
this way, the DLPFC could incorporate the social outcomes of an
observed individual's actions into the planning of our own future
behavior.
Several recent studies in humans have localized brain activity
that varies with whether an actor's behavior appears consistent with
Fig. 1. Experimental stimuli. Each animation began with a dial blinking on
one end of a table (1 s). An adult standing behind a child then verbally
instructed the child (1.5 s) to touch either (a) the blinking dial or to (b) a
different part of the table upon which the dial was placed. The adult's mouth
movements were synchronized with a recording of an adult female voice to
increase the realism of the animation. Following the adult's instruction, the
child moved one of his arms to touch either the dial or the table with equal
probability and then moved his arm back to the initial starting position (2 s),
after which the child remained in that position briefly (0.5 s) before the ITI
began. The child followed instructions in 50% of trials and did not follow
instructions in the other 50%.
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Pelphrey et al., 2003; Saxe et al., 2004). In general, such activity has
not been reported in the DLPFC. However, in none of these studies
were the actors' intentions explicitly specified. In the absence of a
clear context within which to interpret a person's outward behavior,
we may be less likely, or even unable, to evaluate whether that
person's actions appear to fit with their intentions. Moreover, to our
knowledge no prior study has directly investigated whether brain
activity in the DLPFC varies with whether one actor's behavior
appears consistent with a second actor's intentions.
Recent models in social cognitive neuroscience suggest that the
posterior STS may also participate in evaluating the significance of
other people's actions. For quite some time, it has been known that
brain activity in the posterior STS is especially responsive to faces
(Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997) and to biological
motion (Allison et al., 2000; Bonda et al., 1996; Decety and
Grezes, 1999), suggesting a special role for this brain region in
processing social stimuli. More recent findings (Grezes et al.,
2004; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Saxe et al., 2004)
have led to the proposal that, through its analyses of biological
motion, the posterior STS is involved in determining whether other
people's actions appear consistent with our understanding of their
intentions (Morris et al., 2005).
Two crucial aspects of the role of the posterior STS in
evaluating other people's actions remain unclear, however. First, it
is not yet known whether the posterior STS evaluates whether one
person's actions appear consistent with a second person's
intentions. Indeed, it is unclear whether numerous brain regions
thought to be important for social cognition are involved in making
such evaluations, including medial prefrontal regions that are
posited to represent the mental states of other people (Amodio and
Frith, 2006) and inferior frontal regions that have been linked to
understanding other people's actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004). Second, although the posterior STS appears to participate in
evaluating other people's behavior when their intentions are not
made explicit and must therefore be inferred (Grezes et al., 2004;
Pelphrey et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Saxe et al., 2004), it is
not known whether the posterior STS contributes to making such
evaluations when other people's intentions are clearly stated.
Frequently, we must infer other people's intentions because those
intentions are not made explicit (Malle et al., 2001). However, as
illustrated by our example involving the police officers, there are
times when it is important to evaluate whether one person's actions
appear consistent with a second person's intentions when those
intentions are clearly stated.
In the present study, we therefore used fMRI to investigate
whether the DLPFC and the posterior STS contribute to cognitive
control in social situations by evaluating whether one person's ac-
tions appear consistent with a second person's clearly-stated inten-
tions. Study participants' task was to view a series of 5-s computer
animations. In half the animations, a computer-animated adult
verbally instructed a computer-animated child to touch a blinking
dial that was placed on a table (Fig. 1a); in the other half, the adult
instructed the child to touch a different part of the table (Fig. 1b).
Following each of these two possible instructions, the child
performed the instructed action in half the trials and the opposite
action in the other half. Thus, we manipulated whether the child's
actions matched his intentions (i.e., the adult's instructions)
independently of the actions themselves. We predicted that if the
DLPFC and the posterior STS participate in evaluating whether one
person's actions appear consistent with a second person's explicitintentions, then their activity should vary with whether the child
follows the adult's instructions.
Materials and methods
Participants
Eighteen healthy adults (10 male, age range: 18-29, 16 right-
handed) participated in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of serious neurological trauma or
disorders. Furthermore, none reported any problems with their
hearing. Two participants were excluded due to excessive head
motion during the experiment leaving sixteen participants (8 male,
age range: 18-29 years, 15 right-handed). Participants gave informed
consent prior to the experiment in accordancewith theDukeMedical
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session, each participant was shown examples of the different video
clips. The experimenters highlighted the different types of
instructions the adult could give and the different possible actions
the child could perform, but did not describe the videos in terms of
whether the child followed instructions. Participants were paid $20
per hour for their participation, which lasted approximately 2h.
Task
Participants viewed a series of 5-s computer animations created
using Poser 6 software (Curious Labs Inc., Santa Cruz, California).
Each animation began with a dial blinking on one end of a table
(1 s). An adult standing behind a child then verbally instructed the
child (1.5 s) to touch either the blinking dial (Fig. 1a) or a different
part of the table upon which the dial was placed (Fig. 1b). The
adult's mouth movements were synchronized with a recording of
an adult female voice to increase the realism of the animation.
Following the adult's instruction, the child touched the dial or
touched the table with equal probability and then moved his arm
back to the initial starting position (2 s), after which the child
remained in that position briefly (0.5 s) before the inter-trial-
interval (ITI) began.
Four animations were repeated twelve times each in every run.
However, a total of eight different animations were presented
across six runs. In three “dial-on-left” runs, the dial always
appeared on the left side of the table from the child's perspective
(and thus the right side of the table from the participants'
perspective). The child touched the dial by moving his right arm
to the left side of the table and touched the table by moving his left
arm to the right side of the table. In three “dial-on-right” runs, the
dial always appeared on the right side of the table from the child's
perspective (and thus the left side of the table from the participants'
perspective). The child touched the dial by moving his left arm to
the right side of the table and touched the table by moving his right
arm to the left side of the table. In total, the child performed
correctly in 144 trials and incorrectly in the other 144 trials.
Moreover, in half of each of these trial types (i.e., correct and
incorrect), the child moved his right arm and in the other half the
child moved his left arm. For each participant, the three “dial-on-
left” runs were interleaved with the three “dial-on-right” runs. The
nature of the first run (i.e., “dial-on-left” versus “dial-on-right”)
was counterbalanced across participants.
The four computer animations in each run were presented in a
first-order counterbalanced sequence such that each type of
animation was preceded equally often by every type of animation
in the run. The ITI ranged from 0 to 4 TRs following a roughly
exponential distribution that favored short ITIs. Such jittering of
the ITI increases the efficiency with which response estimates for
distinct trial types are made in a multiple regression framework
(Miezin et al., 2000). During the ITI, a still image containing the
child, the adult, and the dial in their initial states was presented.
Thus, none of the trials began with a sudden onset or with a
discontinuity in the positions of the characters or the dial relative to
the prior trial.
Data acquisition
A PC running CIGAL software (Voyvodic, 1999) presented the
animations to participants through MR-compatible goggles and
headphones. Structural images were collected using a T1-weightedspin echo sequence on a 4-Tesla GE whole-body scanner
(TR=500 ms, TE=14 ms, flip angle=90°, 17 contiguous 7 mm-
thick slices – in plane resolution=0.94 mm X 0.94 mm). Functional
images, which measured the blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) signal, were collected using a reverse spiral imaging
sequence (TR=1.25 s, TE=40 ms, flip angle=90°, 17 contiguous
7- mm thick slices – in plane resolution, 3.75 mm × 3.75 mm). Each
participant completed six runs of the task. During each run, 314
functional images were collected. The first six functional images
contained no trials and were discarded.
Data analysis
SPM2 (Friston et al., 1995) was used to correct the functional
images for head motion, normalize the functional images to
standard space, and spatially smooth the functional images with a
three-dimensional Gaussian filter (FWHM=8 mm). Next, the time
series for each run was analyzed using customized software that
implements a version of the general linear model, sometimes called
the finite impulse response (FIR) model, which makes no as-
sumptions about the shape of the BOLD response (Miezin et al.,
2000; Ollinger et al., 2001a,b; Ollinger et al., 2001a,b). This model
estimates the average stimulus-locked fMRI response for each trial
type and has been validated in many prior studies (Miezin et al.,
2000; Shulman et al., 1999; Weissman et al., 2004). Using this
model, we estimated the average stimulus-locked fMRI response to
each of the four types of 5-s-long animations across 18 TRs (i.e.,
22.5s). Because we jittered the ITI, each of these average responses
reflected activity for a specific type of animation relative to our
fixation baseline (Miezin et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 1999;
Weissman et al., 2004). That is, despite the relatively short ITI
(1.25 – 5s), it did not reflect activity for the other types of ani-
mations in the study (Miezin et al., 2000). We then converted every
time point of each average response to units of percent change
from a session-specific, fixation baseline (i.e., the y-intercept term
for that run). Next, for each participant and animation, we
calculated the mean (across runs) of these percent change average
responses, separately at every time point. This procedure yielded a
participant-specific average fMRI response across time (i.e., 18
TRs) to each of the four animations. Finally, in each participant, we
derived the average fMRI responses across time to animations
depicting the child (1) performing an action that was consistent
with the adult's instructions, (2) performing an action that was
inconsistent with the adult's instructions, (3) moving his right arm,
(4) moving his left arm, (5) touching the table, and (6) touching the
dial. Voxelwise analyses of variance (ANOVAs) assessing inter-
actions between Trial Type and Time Point (1−18) were restricted
to particular areas (i.e., dorsolateral prefrontal regions, superior
temporal regions, somatosensory cortex, and visual cortex) and
were thresholded at F(17,255)=2.52, pb0.001.
Region of interest (ROI) analyses
ROIs were defined using functional activations from two
previous studies. ROIs in bilateral regions of the DLPFC were
defined from one of our previous fMRI studies, which also
assessed cognitive control mechanisms under conditions of
audiovisual stimulation (Weissman et al., 2004). Each DLPFC
ROI contained the exact voxels that were activated in our previous
study. ROIs in the left MOG and the right posterior STS were
defined from a prior study of social cognition that was nearly
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instructions preceded the computer-animated character's actions
(Pelphrey et al., 2004). In this prior study, these regions exhibited
significantly greater peak activity when the animated character
touched the table than when he touched the blinking dial. The
authors interpreted this result as evidence that these regions
evaluate whether other people's actions appear consistent with their
intentions. Each of these ROIs was a 27-voxel cube centered on the
local maximum of activation in this prior study.
Stimulus-locked average fMRI responses to individual trial types
were averaged across all voxels in each ROI. Planned contrasts were
performed to assess whether peak activity differed for various trial
types within each ROI. P-values less than 0.05 (one-tailed) were
considered to be significant. All statistical tests in the present study
were conducted using random effects analyses so that our con-
clusions would generalize to the population. Conversion from MNI
to Talairach (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) coordinates was im-
plemented using two non-linear transformations (http://www.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/Common/mnispace.shtml).
Results
Activity in the DLPFC distinguishes inconsistent from consistent
actions
ROI analyses in the left DLPFC (Talairach x, y, and z
coordinates: x=−47, y=17, and z=28 (−47, 17, 28); BA9; 30
voxels) and in the right DLPFC (47, 20, 26; BA 46; 16 voxels)
revealed that peak activity in the left DLPFC was significantly
greater, t(15)=1.77, pb0.05, when the child's actions were
inconsistent with the adult's instructions than when they were
consistent (Fig. 2a, left) (this effect was not significant in the right
DLPFC, pN0.25; Fig. 2a, right). No additional differences in peakFig. 2. Peak activity distinguishes whether or not the child follows the adult's instru
superior temporal sulcus (posterior STS). (a) Regions of interest in the left and the
left DLPFC, highlighted with the red circle, was significantly greater when the child
consistent (this effect did not achieve significance in the right DLPFC). (b) Regio
(MOG) overlaid on a normalized anatomical brain. Peak activity in these regions
instructions. Z coordinates for brain slices refer to MNI space. LH, left hemispheractivity were found in the DLPFC for (1) touching the table versus
touching the dial or (2) movements of the right versus the left arm
(all pN0.20). Thus, activity in the left DLPFC specifically
discriminated whether the child's actions were inconsistent versus
consistent with the adult's instructions. A voxelwise ANOVA
testing for interactions between Trial Type (consistent, incon-
sistent) and Time Point (1–18) in other dorsolateral prefrontal
regions, and in medial prefrontal and inferior frontal regions that
have been implicated in social cognition, revealed no significant
effects (all p-values greater than 0.001).
Activity in the posterior STS does not distinguish inconsistent from
consistent actions
ROI analyses in the left middle occipital gyrus (MOG) (−47, −77,
14; BA 19; 27 voxels) and in the right posterior STS (57, −47, 11; BA
22; 27 voxels) revealed no significant differences in peak activity for
inconsistent versus consistent actions (both pN0.20; Fig. 2b). A
voxelwise ANOVA to test for interactions between Trial Type
(consistent, inconsistent) and Time Point (1–18) in other superior
temporal regions also revealed no significant effects (all p-values
greater than 0.001). Thus, activity in the posterior STS did not
discriminate whether the child's actions were inconsistent versus
consistent with the adult's instructions.
Peak activity in the left MOG and in the right posterior STS
ROIs also did not distinguish peak activity in most of the other
conditions of our experiment. We found no differences in peak
activity between touching the dial and touching the table (right
posterior STS, pN0.27; left MOG, pN0.15) or between left and
right arm movements in the right posterior STS (pN0.33). How-
ever, we did observe significantly greater peak activity for
movements of the left versus the right arm in the left MOG
(pb0.025). Assuming that participants fixated locations at or nearctions in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), but not in the posterior
right DLPFC overlaid on a normalized anatomical brain. Peak activity in the
's actions were inconsistent with the adult's instructions than when they were
ns of interest in the right posterior STS and the left middle occipital gyrus
did not differ depending on whether or not the child followed the adult's
e; RH, right hemisphere.
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left arms, respectively, would have been presented mostly in
participants' left and right visual fields. Thus, the greater activity
for left than for right arm movements in the left MOG could have
been driven by the contralateral organization of the visual system.
In line with this view, a voxelwise ANOVA revealed that right
and left arm movements produced significantly different time
courses of activity, F(17,255)=2.52, pb0.001, in both the left
lingual gyrus (−18,−86,−8; BA 18; 14 voxels) and the right lingual
gyrus (20, −84, −9; BA 18; 44 voxels) in the visual cortex (Fig. 3a).
Follow-up ROI analyses revealed that peak activity in the left lingual
gyrus was significantly greater for left versus right arm movements,
t(15)=3.38, pb0.003 (one-tailed) while the opposite was true in the
right lingual gyrus, t(15)=3.75, pb0.001 (one-tailed). Within the
left and right lingual gyri, no additional differences in peak activity
were observed for (1) inconsistent versus consistent actions or (2)
touching the dial versus touching the table, (t(15)b1 in all cases).
A. mirror neuron system for touch in the human somatosensory
cortex
Recent findings indicate that watching a person being touched on
a particular part of the body results in the activation of corresponding
regions within the perceiver's somatosensory cortex (Blakemore
et al., 2005). Moreover, when we directly face a person, as our study
participants directly faced the child, we appear to simulate their
experiences in body parts that mirror those of the individual
(Pelphrey et al., 2004). Thus, when the computer-animated boy in
the present study touched an object with his right hand, participants
may have simulated touching an object with their left hands, leadingFig. 3. Contralateral activity associated with left and right arm movements in the lin
LG was significantly greater for left arm movements than for right arm movements,
significantly greater when the child moved his left arm than he moved his right ar
movements produced greater activity than left arm movements (color range, dark red
bar. In regions where left arm movements produced greater activity than right arm m
the colors at the bottom of the color bar. Z coordinates for brain slices refer to MNto activation in the right somatosensory cortex, and vice-versa when
the boy touched an object with his left hand.
In line with these predictions, a voxelwise ANOVA assessing
Trial Type (right arm movement, left arm movement) by Time Point
(1−18) interactions revealed significant differences, F(17, 255)=
2.52, pb0.001, between the time courses of activity for right and left
arm movements in both the left (−33,−45, 62; BA 5; 28 voxels) and
the right (28, −38, 69; BA 5; 31 voxels) somatosensory cortex
(Fig. 3b). Follow-up ROI analyses confirmed that in the left
somatosensory cortex left arm movements (watching the boy touch
an object with his left hand) produced significantly greater peak
activity than right armmovements (watching the boy touch an object
with his right hand), t(15)=3.67, pb0.002 (one-tailed), while the
opposite was true in the right somatosensory cortex, t(15)=3.40,
pb0.003 (one-tailed). No additional differences in peak activity in
these brain regions were observed for (1) inconsistent versus
consistent arm movements or (2) touching the dial versus touching
the table (t(15)b1 in all cases).
Adaptation effects
Given the highly repetitive nature of our task, it is possible that
activation differences between inconsistent and consistent actions
in brain regions underlying social cognition were most pronounced
relatively early in the experiment. To investigate this possibility,
we performed a voxelwise ANOVA (threshold: F(17, 255)=2.99,
pb0.0001, 15 contiguous voxels) to test for interactions between
Trial Type (consistent, inconsistent) and Time Point (1−18) in
dorsolateral prefrontal, superior temporal, medial prefrontal, and
inferior frontal regions using data from only the first two runs. Thegual gyrus (LG) and the somatosensory cortex (SSC). (a). Activity in the left
while the opposite was true for the right LG. (b). Activity in the left SSC was
m, while the opposite was true in the right SSC. In regions where right arm
to light yellow), F values are represented by the colors at the top of the color
ovements (color range, dark blue to light green), F values are represented by
I space. LH, left hemisphere; RH, right hemisphere.
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inconsistent and consistent actions in dorsolateral prefrontal,
superior temporal, and inferior prefrontal regions. Furthermore,
ROI analyses in the dorsolateral prefrontal and superior temporal
ROIs we identified earlier indicated that differences in peak
activity between inconsistent and consistent actions were no
greater when only the first two runs of data were included in the
analysis than when all of the runs were included.
However, the voxelwise ANOVA did reveal highly robust,
clearly interpretable activation differences between inconsistent
and consistent actions in several medial prefrontal regions that are
thought to be involved in social cognition. Activations in these
medial prefrontal regions were centered in two regions of the right
precuneus (4, −70, 49; BA 7; 53 voxels and 4, −65, 16; BA23; 23
voxels), the right anterior cingulate cortex (4, 24, 37; BA 32; 41
voxels), the left medial frontal gyrus (−8, 54, 9; BA 10; 23 voxels),
and bilateral regions of the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31; 17
voxels) that included peaks in both the left hemisphere (4, −27, 40)
and the right hemisphere (−4, −27, 40). In every region, these
activation differences reflected significantly greater peak deactiva-
tion for inconsistent than for consistent actions (all pb .02, two-
tailed, except for the right posterior cingulate cortex for which
p=0.05, two tailed). We interpret these effects in greater detail in
the Discussion section.
Discussion
Planning appropriate behavior in social settings often requires
that we evaluate whether one person's actions appear consistent
with a second person's intentions. For example, a parent may plan
his or her next behavior toward a child (e.g., scolding or praising)
by considering whether the child's actions appear inconsistent (e.g.,
eating an entire ice cream cone) or consistent (e.g., sharing the ice
cream cone with a sibling) with the other parent's intentions for the
child (e.g., sharing the ice cream cone). Evaluating whether one
individual's actions appear consistent with a second individual's
intentions can also be helpful for identifying the individuals'
relative social ranks which, in hierarchically-organized primate
societies, strongly influences the selection of social behaviors
(Bergman et al., 2003). Thus, understanding the psychological and
neural mechanisms that enable us to evaluate the outcomes of
observed social interactions is crucial for developing models of
how we plan our behavior in social situations.
In the present study, we found that regions of the DLPFC,
which have been implicated in cognitive control, were more active
when a computer-animated boy's actions appeared inconsistent
with a computer-animated adult's instructions than when they
appeared consistent. However, this effect was absent in regions of
the posterior STS that have been posited to play a crucial role in
evaluating the appropriateness of other people's actions within a
particular situational context. These findings have major implica-
tions for neurobiological models of both cognitive control and
social cognition.
The DLPFC is thought to contribute to cognitive control by
maintaining our intentions in working memory (Miller and Cohen,
2001), including the rules for accomplishing those intentions. It is
also posited to link our actions to their eventual outcomes so that
previous experiences can be used to guide future behavior
(Genovesio et al., 2006; Petrides, 1995; Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi,
2004, 2005). The present findings appear to extend the role of the
DLPFC in cognitive control to maintaining our understanding ofone person's intentions in working memory and evaluating whether
a second person's actions appear consistent with those intentions.
The DLPFC may thereby allow the social outcomes of other
people's actions to influence the planning of our future behavior.
For example, the DLPFC may help us to learn new social
behaviors by observing the trials and tribulations of other indi-
viduals performing them, an ability that chimpanzees also possess
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986). Given these considerations, our
findings suggest that the DLPFC is a major site of interaction
between the processes underlying cognitive control and those
supporting social cognition.
The posterior STS has been posited to make a major
contribution to social cognition by evaluating whether other
people's actions, conveyed through biological motion, appear
consistent with their intentions (Morris et al., 2005). In the present
study, we found no evidence to support a role for the posterior STS
in evaluating whether one person's actions are consistent with a
second person's intentions. This result appears to constrain the role
of the STS in social cognition to evaluating whether an observed
person's actions appear consistent with his or her own intentions.
Alternatively, the posterior STS may be involved in determin-
ing whether one person's actions are consistent with a second
person's intentions, but mainly when those intentions are not
explicitly stated. Indeed, in many prior studies of the posterior STS
and its role in social cognition, the actors' intentions were not
clearly specified (Grezes et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2004;
Pelphrey et al., 2003; Saxe et al., 2004) and therefore needed to be
inferred by study participants. In these more ambiguous situations,
the posterior STS might contribute to generating an inference about
what an observed person is doing by performing highly elaborated
perceptual processing of whatever biological motion information is
available. When an observed person's actions do not appear
appropriate in a particular context, and an inference is therefore
relatively difficult to make, the need for elaborated perceptual
processing by the posterior STS might be especially high. Clearly,
future studies will be needed to test this possibility. At present, we
conclude that the posterior STS is not involved in evaluating
whether one person's actions appear consistent with a second
person's intentions, at least when those intentions are explicitly
stated.
Since our animations portrayed relatively simple behaviors and
were highly repetitive, we considered the possibility that some
regions underlying social cognition might have been most involved
in our task relatively early in the experiment. To test this hypothesis,
we performed additional analyses using data from only the first two
runs. These analyses revealed effects in dorsolateral prefrontal and
superior temporal regions that were highly similar in magnitude to
those we reported in our overall analysis. However, they also
revealed several medial prefrontal regions, including the precuneus,
bilateral regions of the posterior cingulate cortex, the anterior
cingulate cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex, in which
inconsistent actions produced larger deactivations than consistent
actions (i.e., regions in which consistent actions evoked greater
activity than inconsistent actions). Some of these medial prefrontal
regions have been posited to formmental representations of people's
psychological attributes, including their beliefs, intentions, and
goals (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Therefore, one possible interpreta-
tion of our findings is that participants were better able to form
mental representations of the child's intentions when the child
performed correctly (in which case the child's intentions were clearly
to follow the adult's instructions) than when the child perform
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clear).
Our findings also provide further support for the existence of a
mirror neuron system for touch (Blakemore et al., 2005). When we
directly face an individual, as participants did in the present
experiment, we often mirror that individual's movements and
sensations in a body part (e.g., the left hand) that mirrors the body
part that is being manipulated by the observed individual (e.g., the
right hand) (Pelphrey et al., 2004). In line with this view, activity in
the right somatosensory cortex was significantly greater when
participants observed the boy touch an object with his right hand
(mirrored with the left hand) than when they observed the boy
touch an object with his left hand (mirrored with the right hand),
and the opposite pattern was observed in the left somatosensory
cortex. Although we did not show that the same somatosensory
regions were activated when participants observed the boy touch
an object and when participants were actually touched (Keysers
et al., 2004), the present findings appear to add to a growing body
of data indicating a mirror neuron system for touch in the human
somatosensory cortex.
In conclusion, our results have important implications for
neurobiological theories of both cognitive control and social
cognition. First, they suggest that the DLPFC is a crucial interface
between the processes that underlie cognitive control and those that
support social cognition. Second, they suggest that the contribution
of the posterior STS to social cognition does not include evaluating
whether the actions of one individual appear consistent with the
intentions of a second individual, at least in situations where those
intentions are explicitly stated. Future studies of the interplay
between cognitive control and social cognition should investigate
whether our findings generalize to interpreting more complex
social interactions. More generally, they should further our
understanding of the neural mechanisms that enable voluntary
behavior in social environments.
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